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Executive equity comepnsation and earnings management:  
A quantile regression analysis 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Prior research has investigated the association between executive equity 
compensation and earnings management but the evidence is not conclusive. We 
investigate this question using the quantile regression approach which allows the 
coefficient on the independent variable (equity compensation) to shift across the 
distribution of the dependent variable (earnings management). Based on a sample of 
18,203 U.S. non-financial firm-year observations from 1995 to 2008, we find that 
chief executive officer (CEO) equity compensation is positively associated with the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals at all quantiles of absolute discretionary 
accruals, but the association becomes weaker as the quantile decreases. The 
association between CEO equity compensation and signed values of discretionary 
accruals is positive (negative) when the discretionary accruals are at the high (medium 
and low) quantiles. The results are robust to alternative measures of equity incentives 
and earnings management and alternative model specifications. Overall, the quantile 
regression results suggest that equity compensation motivates income-increasing 
earnings management when the firm has low financial reporting quality, but mitigates 
income-increasing earnings management when the financial reporting quality is high. 
The results also demonstrate that the least-squares and least-sum optimization 
techniques which are used commonly in prior research do not capture the behavior of 
firms at the high and low quantiles of financial reporting quality.  
 
 
Keywords:  Equity incentives, executive compensation, quantile regression, earnings 
management, discretionary accruals 
JEL classification: G12; G32 
Data Availability: All data are obtained from publicly available sources. 
 
1. Introduction 
Whether equity compensation motivates corporate executives to manage 
earnings has been debated for years. Academic research also has investigated this 
question but the evidence is not conclusive. Most studies find a positive association 
between the chief executive officer (CEO) equity compensation and earnings 
management, using proxies such as discretionary accruals and restatement of financial 
report, but some others do not find a positive association. These different results are 
obtained despite that the studies use similar proxies for equity incentives and earnings 
management. However, research design could be a factor that causes the different 
results. It is common in prior studies on equity compensation and earnings 
management to use a matched-pairs sample where a restating firm is matched with a 
non-restating firm using a small number of variables such as firm size and industry 
classification. Instead of using this common approach, Armstrong et al. (2009) use a 
propensity score matching process and find some evidence that the level of CEO 
equity incentives has a modest negative relationship with the incidence of accounting 
irregularities. 
Our study adds to the research on CEO equity compensation and earnings 
management by investigating their relationship across the entire distribution of 
earnings management using the quantile regression, which does not require the 
regression coefficients to be constant. In empirical research, the constant-coefficient 
regression models, such as the ordinary least squared (OLS) and least-sum of absolute 
deviations (LAD), are used extensively. However, these models only describe the 
average behavior of the dependent variable (i.e., central distribution tendency) and the 
resulting coefficient estimates are not necessarily indicative of the size and nature of 
the effects of the independent variables on the tails of the dependent variable’s 
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distribution. In addition, the analytical framework in prior research tends to assume an 
unconditional distribution of firm observations. This form of “sample truncation” may 
yield invalid empirical results (Heckman, 1979). 
The quantile regression (hereafter, QR) approach was developed by Koenker 
and Basset (1978) and used widely in recent economics and finance research. 
Quantile describes a division of observations into intervals based on the values of the 
data. The QR model is a random-coefficient model in which the parameter of the 
independent variable can be expressed as a monotonic function of a single scalar 
random variable, hence capturing the systematic influences of the independent 
variables on the location, scale, and shape of the conditional distribution of the 
dependent variable. The QR approach can be used to examine whether the traditional 
optimization techniques fail to address the behaviors in the tail regions of the 
dependent variable’s distribution (e.g., at the 0.05 or 0.95 quantile).1 This approach 
differs from segmenting the dependent variable into subsets according to its 
unconditional distribution and then doing least squares fitting on these subsets. To the 
extent that the sample segmentation and the relation between equity compensation 
and earnings management are jointly determined, using QR can address the potential 
problem in prior studies that assume segmentation of the sample is exogeneous.  
We use discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management, where 
positive (negative) values imply income-increasing (income-decreasing) earnings 
management and larger absolute values imply more extreme earnings management. 
We measure equity compensation as the fair value of stock options and restricted 
stock granted to the CEO scaled by the CEO’s total compensation. The sample 
                                                 
1 As discussed below, the QR model minimizes a sum of weighted absolute residuals. For example, the 
results at the 0.90 quantile are estimated when the positive (negative) residuals are given a 90 (10) 
percent of weight. The LAD results are the same as the QR results at the 0.50 quantile where the 
positive and negative residuals are equally weighted. 
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consists of 18,203 observations of U.S. non-financial firms (S&P 500 and medium 
and small cap) for the period from 1995 to 2008. We perform the QR at 19 quantiles, 
starting from quantile 0.05 and increasing by 0.05 each time up to quantile 0.95. 
In the OLS regression of absolute discretionary accruals, we find the 
coefficient on equity compensation to be significantly positive. The QR results also 
show a significantly positive coefficient on equity compensation at all quantiles of 
absolute discretionary accruals, but the coefficient decreases monotonically as the 
quantile decreases, and becomes very small at the low quantiles. The coefficients at 
any two adjoining quantiles are significantly different from each other, indicating that 
the relation between equity compensation and earnings management varies with the 
likelihood of earnings management. 
In the OLS regression of signed values of discretionary accruals, we find the 
coefficient on equity compensation to be statistically insignificant. However, the QR 
results show that the coefficient on equity compensation increases monotonically as 
the quantile of signed values of discretionary accruals increases. The coefficient is 
significantly negative at the 0.05 to 0.65 quantiles, statistically insignificant at the 
0.70 to 0.80 quantiles, and significantly positive at the 0.85 to 0.95 quantiles.  
Taken together, the QR results show that equity compensation is positively 
associated with absolute and signed values of discretionary accruals only at the high 
quantiles of these two accruals measures (i.e. low financial reporting quality). At the 
medium and low quantiles of signed values of discretionary accruals, equity 
compensation is negatively associated with discretionary accruals. The results are 
robust to alternative measures of discretionary accruals and equity incentives (such as 
lagged equity compensation to total compensation, and pay-for-performance 
sensitivity) and alternative model specifications. Overall, the results suggest that 
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equity compensation motivates income-increasing earnings management in firms with 
characteristics associated with lower financial reporting quality. Conversely, in firms 
with high financial reporting quality, equity compensation mitigates income- 
increasing earnings management. The results also demonstrate that the least-squares 
and least-sum optimization techniques used commonly in prior research do not 
capture the behavior of firms at the extreme quantiles of financial reporting quality. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we employ a 
methodology that recognizes heterogeneity in the dependent variable of the regression 
(earnings management) and considers the entire distribution of the variable, hence 
producing results that cannot be observed under the OLS and LAD approaches. 
Second, we use an empirical model that produces quantile-varying estimators rather 
than relying on a single measure of conditional central tendency, thereby linking 
equity compensation and earnings management in a continuous and smooth manner. 
Taking advantage of the less restrictive research design and empirical model, our 
study provides evidence that helps to explain the inconsistent findings in prior 
research concerning the relationship between CEO equity compensation and earnings 
management.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related studies 
and develops the research questions. Section 3 discusses the theoretical models. 
Section 4 describes the sample, variables, and empirical model. Section 5 discusses 
the empirical results. Section 6 discusses the results for robustness tests and 
alternative specifications. Section 7 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related Studies and research questions 
2.1 Studies on equity compensation and earnings management 
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Prior studies have investigated the association between CEO equity 
compensation and earnings management extensively. Most studies find positive 
associations. For example, Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007) find a positive 
association between compensation mix (equity compensation divided by total 
compensation) and discretionary accruals, and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find 
a positive association between incentive ratio and discretionary accruals. Some 
studies, however, do not find a statistically significant association between equity 
compensation and earnings management (Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew 2006; 
Baber, Kang, and Liang 2007). There is also research showing that the association is 
negative. Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2010) find some evidence that 
accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms where CEOs have relatively 
higher levels of equity incentives. 
Some studies further investigate the association between the components of 
equity compensation and earnings management. Harris and Bromiley (2007), Burns 
and Kedia (2006), and Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson (2007), find positive 
associations only for option-related compensation, Cheng and Warfield (2005) find 
positive associations for unvested options and stock ownership, and Johnson, Ryan, 
and Tian (2009) find positive associations for vested stock holdings. O’Connor et al. 
(2006) find that the association is positive for option-related equity components only 
when conditioned on the board of directors’ composition and compensation structure.  
2.2 Development of research questions 
Our study differs from prior research on the association between equity 
compensation and earnings management in that our analysis incorporates the potential 
influences of financial reporting quality on the association. Prior studies document a 
link between corporate governance and financial reporting quality (e.g., Dechow et al. 
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1996; Beasley 1996; Klein 2002), and a link between corporate governance and 
executive compensation (e.g., Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 1999). Therefore, firms 
with characteristics associated with low financial reporting quality likely have poor 
corporate governance, which can lead to inefficient compensation contracts 
(particularly stock options grants) that increase the manager’s incentives to engage in 
earnings management.  
Whether equity compensation motivates earnings management also depends 
on the costs and benefits of earnings management, but the costs and benefits are likely 
to vary with the firm’s financial reporting quality. When financial reporting quality is 
lower, the expected costs of earnings management would be lower, as the (poor) 
corporate governance is less likely to deter earnings management and detection of 
earnings management is less likely to surprise the market participants. On the other 
hand, the expected benefits of earnings management would also be lower if the 
market participants perceive the financial reports to be of lower quality and discount 
the reported numbers accordingly. Prior research has not provided theoretical 
guidance on how the costs and benefits of earnings management vary with the quality 
of financial reporting, but if such variation exists, whether equity compensation 
motivates earnings management could also depend on the quality of financial 
reporting.  
To investigate the conditional relationship between equity compensation and 
earnings management, one might think of a two-step estimation procedure which has 
been used in prior studies but on issues different from ours. The typical procedure is 
that in the first step the sample is partitioned on a factor, such as financial reporting 
quality in the context of our study, and in the second step the traditional optimization 
techniques (such as OLS or LAD) are used to fit the data and conduct comparative 
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analyses between the partitioned segments. This two-step analysis implicitly assumes 
that the partitioning process is exogenous. However, to the extent that the link 
between equity compensation and earnings management is conditional on the firm’s 
financial reporting quality, the sample segmentation and the link between equity 
compensation and earnings management should be analyzed jointly. 
Based on the above discussion, we aim to investigate whether (and how) the 
association between equity compensation and earnings management varies with the 
perceived financial reporting quality of the firm. To investigate this question, it is 
necessary to employ a methodology that can analyze the association over a range of 
the values of the conditioned variable (financial reporting quality). Neither the OLS 
and LAD approach, nor the two-step estimation procedure mentioned above, can 
satisfy the need, but the quantile regression approach can. In the next section we 
discuss the properties of the OLS, LAD, and quantile regression models, and 
demonstrate that the quantile regression approach is an appropriate method to use in 
our study. 
 
3. Theoretical models 
3.1 OLS and LAD models 
Let (yit, xit), i = 1, 2…, N and t = 1, 2…, T, be a sample population, where 
subscript i denotes the ith firm and t denotes the tth period. The dependent variable, yit, 
is a proxy for the firm’s earnings management, and xit is a KX1 vector of explanatory 
variables for yit. When the data have a panel structure, the following equation 
represents a fixed-effects model: 
ititit uxy +⋅= β' ,                                               (1) 
where β is a KX1 vector of unknown parameters to be estimated.   
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The non-quantile model in Equation (1) is potentially limited due to the use of 
a constant loading in each identified determinant of the explained variable. 
Specifically, once the final result is derived from Equation (1), the values of all the 
elements in the KX1 vector, β, are fixed across all firms. 
Using the OLS optimization technique, we can obtain the estimator vector of β 
from the following equation: 
22 )'()(min β⋅∑ −∑ = it
i
it
i
it xyu .                                    (2) 
As to the β estimate in the LAD model, the sum of absolute errors can be 
minimized by following the model below: 
∑
i
itu ||min  = .                                    (3) |'| β⋅∑ − it
i
it xy
In Equations (2) and (3), the error terms are equally weighted, hence  
represents the conditional mean and the conditional median functions in the OLS and 
LAD optimization techniques, respectively.  
β⋅'itx
3.2 Quantile regression model 
A major limitation of the OLS and LAD models is that their estimates provide 
only one measure of the central distribution tendency of the dependent variable and 
fail to consider the behavior of the dependent variable in the tail regions. To address 
this issue, various random-coefficient models have emerged as viable alternatives in 
the field of statistical application. The quantile regression (QR hereafter) model is one 
of those alternatives. We employ the QR approach in this study because the parameter 
of the independent variable can be expressed as a monotonic function of a single, 
scalar, random variable. The QR model captures systematic influences of the 
conditioning variables on the location, scale, and shape of the conditional distribution 
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of the response. Therefore, implementing the QR model allows us to explore whether 
the traditional optimization techniques fail to address the behaviors in the tail regions 
of the dependent variable’s distribution (i.e., when the quality of financial reporting is 
very high or low).   
Assume that the θth quantile of the conditional distribution of the dependent 
variable, , is linear in , the conditional QR model can be expressed as follows: ity itx
{ }
0)(
')(:inf)(
'
=
⋅=≡
+⋅=
itit
itititit
ititit
xuQuant
xxyFyxyQuant
uxy
θθ
θθ
θθ
βθ
β
,                         (4) 
where )( itit xyQuantθ  denotes the θth conditional quantile of yit on the regressor 
vector xit; βθ is the unknown vector of parameters to be estimated for different values 
of θ in (0,1); and uθit is the error term assumed to be drawn from a continuously 
differentiable distribution function, Fuθ(.|x), and density function, fuθ(.|x). The value Fit 
(.|x) denotes the conditional distribution of the dependent variable conditional on x.  
By varying the value of θ from 0 to 1, the QR approach allows users to trace the entire 
distribution of y conditional on x. 
The estimator for βθ is obtained from: 
      ∑ ∑ ⋅−×−+⋅−×=
∑ ∑ ×−+×
>⋅− <⋅−
> <
0': 0':
0: 0:
.|'|)1(|'|
)1(||min
* *
θ θ
θ θ
β β θθ
θθ
βθβθ
θθ
itit itit
it it
xyit xyit
itititit
uit uit
itit
xyxy
uu
           (5) 
Although the estimators in Equation (5) do not have an explicit form, the 
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minimization problem can be solved using linear programming techniques.2  
Comparing Equation (5) with Equations (2) and (3) reveals a major feature of 
the QR technique: the estimator vector of βθ varies with θ. By comparing the 
behaviors with different θ further, one can characterize the dynamic estimator vector, 
βθ, in various regions of financial reporting quality. A comparison of Equation (5) 
with Equation (3) also reveals that the LAD estimator is a special case of the 
quantile-varying estimator at the 0.50 quantile. Because the LAD estimators only 
represent a special case of the quantile-varying estimator, they denote a single 
measure of the central distribution tendency, without considering the behavior of 
residuals in the tail region.  
The QR approach has been widely used in many areas of applied economics 
and econometrics, such as wage structure (Buchinsky, 1994, 1995; Mueller, 2000; 
Angrist, et al., 2006; Chernozhukov and Hansena, 2006), earnings mobility (Trede, 
1998; Eide and Showalter, 1999; Gosling, et al., 2000), and educational quality issues 
(Eide and Showalter, 1998; Levin, 2001). There is also growing interest in employing 
QR in finance research. Applications in this field include works on Value at Risk 
(Taylor, 1999; Chernozhukov and Umantsev, 2001; Engle and Manganelli, 2004), 
option pricing (Morillo, 2000), the cross section of stock market returns (Barnes and 
Hughes, 2002), mutual fund investment styles (Bassett and Chen, 2001), hedge fund 
strategies (Meligkotsidou, Vrontos, and Vrontos, 2009), and bankruptcy prediction (Li 
and Miu, 2010). This study serves as the first attempt to apply the QR models in the 
research on CEO equity compensation and earnings management. 
In this study, we use the design-matrix bootstrap method to estimate the 
                                                 
2 See Koenker (2000) and Koenker and Hallock (2001) for related discussions.  
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standard error of the coefficients in the QR model. 3  In a Monte Carlo study, 
Buchinsky (1994) recommends bootstrap methods for studies with relatively small 
samples because bootstrap methods are robust when changes are made in bootstrap 
sample size relative to the data sample size.4 Furthermore, we use the percentile 
method proposed by Koenker and Hallock (2001) to construct confidence intervals for 
each parameter in βθ, where the intervals are computed from the empirical distribution 
of the sample of the bootstrapped estimates.5 In comparison with standard asymptotic 
confidence intervals, the bootstrap percentile intervals are not symmetric around the 
underlying parameter estimate. 6  Therefore, these bootstrap procedures can be 
extended to handle the joint distribution of various QR estimators, which allows us to 
test equality of the parameters across various quantiles (Koenker and Hallock 2001). 
 
4. Sample, variables, and empirical model 
4.1 Sample 
Our sample consists of U.S. non-financial firms with the required financial 
and compensation data available from Compustat and ExecuComp for the period from 
1995 to 2008. We exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) as discretionary accruals 
are not appropriate measures of financial reporting quality (earnings management) for 
them. The final sample consists of 18,203 firm-year observations from 2,320 unique 
firms.  
4.2 Measures of financial reporting quality and equity compensation 
Earnings management is pervasive (Graham et al. 2005) but not always 
                                                 
3 Two approaches are generally used to estimate the covariance matrix of the regression parameter 
vector. The first derives the asymptotic standard errors of the estimators, while the second uses 
bootstrap methods to compute standard errors and construct confidence intervals. 
4 Appendix A provides details of the bootstrap estimate of the standard error. 
5 See Buchinsky (1998) for a detailed discussion of the percentile method. 
6 This is useful when the true sampling distribution is not symmetric. 
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observable. However, firms with larger accruals are more likely to have restatements 
(Richardson et al. 2003). Following prior studies related to ours (e.g., Bergstresser 
and Philippon 2006; Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna 2007), we use discretionary 
accruals as a measure of earnings management. We estimate discretionary accruals 
using a cross-sectional version of modified Jones model after controlling for prior 
performance, as Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) find that performance-matched 
discretionary accrual measures enhance the reliability of the inferences from earnings 
management research. Specifically, we estimate the following equation by 
year-industry (2-digit SIC): 
titi
ti
ti
ti
titi
titi
ti ROA
TA
PPE
TA
ARSALE
TATA
TACC
,1,3
1,
,
2
1,
,,
1
1,
0
1,
, 1 εαααα +++Δ−Δ+= −
−−−−
,(6) 
where TACC equals total accruals, TA equals total assets, ΔSALES equals change in 
net sales, ΔAR equals change in net accounts receivable, PPE equals net property, 
plant, and equipment, ROA equals rate of return on asset, and ε is an error term. The 
subscripts, i and t, denote firm and year, respectively. Total accruals are separated into 
two components: (i) nondiscretionary accruals, which equal the fitted value of total 
accruals obtained from estimating Equation (6), and (ii) discretionary accruals 
(denoted by DA), which equal the residuals from estimating Equation (6). 
We measure equity incentives (denoted by EQCOM) as total value of the 
CEO’s stock-based compensation (restricted stock and stock options) divided by total 
compensation.7 This measure is termed compensation mix in some studies (e.g., 
Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna 2007). The value of stock options is computed based 
on the Black-Scholes model as of the date the options are granted. 
                                                 
7 As discussed later, we obtain qualitatively similar results when measuring equity incentives by the 
pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
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4.3 Empirical model  
The empirical model we estimate is a regression of discretionary accruals on 
equity compensation and a set of control variables, including the book-to-market ratio 
(a proxy for growth opportunities), net cash flows from operations, leverage, and size. 
Prior studies have found associations between these factors and accruals (e.g., Becker 
et al. 1998; Francis and Krishnan 1999; Myers, Myers, and Omer 2003; Menon and 
Williams 2004). The model we estimate is as follows: 
|DAi,t| or DAi,t = β0 + β1EQCOMi,t + β2BMi,t + β3OCFi,t + β4LEVi,t  
+ β5SIZEi,t + εi,t,              (7) 
where DA equals discretionary accruals and EQCOM equals equity compensation 
(both are defined previously), BM equals book value of equity divided by market 
value of equity, OCF equals net cash flows from operations divided by lagged total 
assets, LEV equals total liabilities divided by total assets, and SIZE equals natural 
logarithm of total assets. See Table 1 for detailed variable definitions. 
Earnings can be managed upward or downward depending on the manager’s 
incentives. When the magnitude of earnings management is a concern but the 
direction is not, the absolute value of discretionary accruals is an appropriate measure 
of earnings management. However, if income-increasing earnings management is a 
more serious concern than income-decreasing earnings management, it is more 
appropriate to investigate the signed (raw) values of discretionary accruals. We think 
it is important to analyze both situations, so we investigate both absolute and signed 
values of discretionary accruals. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
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Table 1, Panel A, presents descriptive statistics of the variables. The mean and 
median of DA equals -0.0116 and -0.0055, respectively.8 The mean and median of 
|DA| equals 0.0690 and 0.0367, respectively. In view of the distribution of DA, it is an 
expected result that the mean of |DA| is much greater than the median. The mean 
(median) of EQCOM equals 0.4210 (0.4502), which indicate that on average, the 
CEOs in our sample receive more than 40 percent of their total pay in the form of 
equity compensation. Except for the book-to-market value of equity, the other control 
variables have symmetric distributions. 
Table 1, Panel B, presents the Pearson correlation coefficients. EQCOM is 
positively correlated with |DA| and negatively correlated with DA. These two 
coefficients are statistically significant, though the magnitude is not large (both below 
0.02). Net cash flows from operations, leverage, and firm size are negatively 
correlated with |DA|, and leverage is positively correlated with DA. Some of the 
control variables are correlated with each other, but a high correlation coefficient is 
observed only between leverage and size. 
5.2 Equity incentives and absolute discretionary accruals  
Our study concentrates on the QR analysis, but we also estimate the OLS and 
LAD regressions for the purpose of comparison with the QR results. Note that LAD 
regression is the same as QR at the 0.5 quantile of the dependent variable.  
Table 2 presents the estimated coefficient for equity compensation when the 
dependent variable equals absolute discretionary accruals (|DA|). Panel A shows that 
in the OLS regression, the coefficient on EQCOM equals 0.0247 (t-value = 3.45), 
                                                 
8 We estimate discretionary accruals based on the entire ExecuComp population with sufficient data 
from Compustat for estimating Equation (6). By construction, the average DA should be close to zero. 
However, some of the ExecuComp firms are not in our final sample due to lack of other data required 
for estimating the main regression in Equation (7). Our empirical results are not sensitive to the 
population of firms used to estimate discretionary accruals. 
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consistent with prior research findings that equity incentives are positively associated 
with earnings management. The coefficient on EQCOM in the LAD regression equals 
0.0157 (t-value = 12.39, see the result for quantile 0.5), consistent with the OLS 
estimate.9   
The QR results in Panel A of Table 2 show that the coefficient on EQCOM is 
significantly positive at all quantiles of |DA|, increasing monotonically from 0.0017 at 
the 0.05 quantile to 0.0973 at the 0.95 quantile. Panel B shows that the coefficient at 
any two adjoining quantiles is significantly different from each other. However, 
despite its statistical significance, the coefficient on EQCOM is very small at the low 
quantiles. For example, based on the inter-quartile range of EQCOM (= 0.506), the 
coefficient on EXCOM at the 0.05 and 0.10 quantile translates into a |DA| of only 
0.086 percent and 0.157 percent, respectively, of lagged total assets. 
We replicate the regressions after replacing the raw values of EQCOM by 
decile rankings scaled to range between zero and one. The results (not tabulated) 
indicate that the coefficient on EQCOM is significantly positive at all quantiles of 
|DA|. It increases monotonically from 0.0015 at the 0.05 quantile to 0.0748 at the 0.95 
quantile. These results are similar to those shown in Table 2. 
To better understand the variation of the coefficient on equity incentives across 
the quantiles, we plot the 95% confidence intervals of the coefficient estimates in 
Figure 1. The figure also shows the OLS coefficient estimate for comparison. None of 
the confidence intervals for the QR estimates overlap with zero, which is expected 
given that the coefficient on EQCOM is significantly positive at all quantiles. The 
confidence intervals at the 0.80-0.95 quantiles do not overlap with those at the 0.55- 
0.65 quantiles, which in turn do not overlap with those at the 0.05-0.40 quantiles. The 
                                                 
9 The difference between the conditional median estimate (0.0157 in the LAD regression) and mean 
estimate (0.0247 in the OLS regression) can be partially due to the asymmetric conditional density and 
a strong effect exerted on the least squares fit by the possible outlier observations in the sample. 
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95% confidence interval for the OLS estimate overlaps with only the QR estimates’ 
confidence intervals at the 0.35-0.80 quantiles. These findings show that the OLS 
estimate does not capture the relation between CEO equity incentives and earnings 
management at the high and low quantiles of absolute discretionary accruals (i.e., 
when the quality of financial reporting is very low or very high). 
Taken together, the results in Table 2 and Figure 1 suggest that, on average, 
higher equity incentives are associated with more extreme earnings management. But 
the association is weaker when the firm has characteristics suggesting higher financial 
reporting quality. When the quality of financial reporting is very high, the association 
between equity incentives and earnings management becomes economically trivial, 
and the OLS method overestimates the association.  
To conserve space, instead of tabulating the results for the control variables at 
different quantiles, we plot the coefficient estimates and their 95% confidence 
intervals in Figure 2. The figure shows that the coefficient on the book-to-market 
value of equity is not statistically significant at all quantile. The coefficient on OCF is 
significantly negative at the 0.90 and 0.95 quantiles but is indistinguishable from zero 
at the other quantiles, suggesting that net operating cash flows is negatively associated 
with absolute discretionary accruals only when absolute discretionary accruals are 
very high. The coefficient on LEV is significantly negative at all quantiles but much 
more negative at the 0.95 quantile. The coefficient on SIZE is always significantly 
negative and decreases monotonically with the quantile level. For OCF and LEV, the 
95% confidence intervals of the coefficient at the 0.05-0.10 quantiles have no overlap 
with those at the 0.90-0.95 quantiles. The 95% confidence intervals of the coefficient 
on SIZE at the high (0.70-0.95) quantiles have no overlap with each other and with 
those at the low (0.05-0.60) quantiles. Overall, the QR results show that the 
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associations of net operating cash flows, leverage, and size with earnings management 
are much stronger when the firm has lower financial reporting quality.10
5.3 Equity incentives and signed values of discretionary accruals 
We replicate the above OLS and QR analyses using the signed values of 
discretionary accruals (DA) as the dependent variable. The results for equity 
incentives are presented in Table 3. Note that since the median (quantile 0.50) of DA 
is close to zero, DA at the 0.55 quantile or above (0.45 quantile or below) in Table 3 
are positive (negative).  
Panel A of Table 3 shows that, in the OLS regression of DA, the coefficient on 
EQCOM equals -0.0121 (t-value = -1.62). The LAD estimate of this coefficient equals 
-0.0162 (t-value = -10.67, see the QR result at the 0.50 quantile in the same panel). 
The QR results show that the coefficient on EQCOM increases monotonically with 
the quantile level of DA, ranging from -0.0919 at the 0.05 quantile to 0.0266 at the 
0.95 quantile, and the coefficient is significantly negative (positive) at the 0.05-0.65 
(0.85-0.95) quantiles. Panel B shows that the coefficient at any two adjoining 
quantiles is significantly different from each other. 
When we replicate the regressions after replacing the raw values of EQCOM 
by decile rankings scaled to range between zero and one, we find that the coefficient 
on EQCOM increases monotonically from -0.0788 at the 0.05 quantile to 0.0208 at 
the 0.95 quantile (results not tabulated). The coefficient is significantly negative 
(positive) at the 0.05-0.70 (0.80-0.95) quantiles. These results are qualitatively similar 
to those shown in Table 3. 
Figure 3 plots the 95% confidence intervals of the OLS and QR coefficient 
estimates for EQCOM when the dependent variable equals DA. The 95% confidence 
                                                 
10 The detailed test results for equality of the parameter estimates between quantiles are available from 
the authors upon request.  
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intervals at the very high (0.90 and 0.95) and low (0.05 to 0.20) quantiles have no 
overlap with the 95% confidence interval of the OLS estimate. Therefore, consistent 
with the results from regression of |DA|, the findings in Table 3 and Figure 3 show 
that the OLS estimate does not capture the relation between CEO equity incentives 
and earnings management at the high and low quantiles of raw values of discretionary 
accruals. Overall, the QR results show a positive association between equity 
incentives and income-increasing earnings management only when the firm has 
characteristics suggesting poor financial reporting quality (DA at high quantiles). 
When the quality of financial reporting is relatively good, equity incentives are 
negatively associated with income-increasing earnings management. 
The control variables’ coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence intervals 
of the estimates are plotted in Figure 4. The figure shows a generally similar pattern 
of variation of the coefficients and their confidence intervals over the quantiles of DA 
when compared with Figure 2. The only differences are that net operating cash flows 
has a significantly negative coefficient at all quantiles of DA, and the coefficient on 
firm size is significantly positive at the low quantiles of DA. Overall, the QR results 
show higher associations of net operating cash flows and leverage with income- 
increasing earnings management when the firm has lower financial reporting quality. 
Firm size is positively (negatively) associated with income-increasing earnings 
management when the firm has high (low) financial reporting quality.  
 
6. Robustness tests 
We conduct various tests to check the robustness of the primary results 
discussed above. The tests include using alternative measures of discretionary 
accruals and CEO equity incentives, controlling for additional confounding factors in 
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the regressions, using an instrumental variable approach to address the potential 
endogeneity problem, and using a first-difference specification (i.e., changes model).  
6.1 Using alternative measures of discretionary accruals and equity incentives 
In the empirical analysis discussed above, we use discretionary accruals 
adjusted for lagged performance, following the argument by Kothari, Leone, and 
Wasley (2005) that performance-matched discretionary accrual measures enhance the 
reliability of the inferences from earnings management research. Since some prior 
studies on equity compensation and earnings management estimate discretionary 
accruals using modified Jones model, we replicate all the regressions using this 
alternative measure of discretionary accruals. The results (not shown) are similar to 
those reported in the tables and figures. We also obtain similar regression results using 
discretionary accruals adjusted for contemporaneous performance. 
In the primary analysis we measure CEO equity incentives as total value of 
restricted stock and stock options granted to the CEO divided by total compensation. 
Some prior studies measure CEO equity incentives in a different way, such as the 
pay-for-performance sensitivity and the value of stock options granted divided by 
total compensation. Therefore, we replicate the regressions using these two alternative 
measures of equity incentives.  
Following the method in Core and Guay (2002), and Broussard, Buchenroth, 
and Pilotte (2004), we define pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) as the partial 
derivative of the Black-Scholes option value with respect to the stock price. 11  
However, to mitigate the potential problem of heteroskedasticity, we use the natural 
logarithm instead of the raw value.  
                                                 
11 Data on the Black-Scholes stock option values are no longer available on ExecuComp after 2006. To 
ensure use of consistent estimation method for option values across years, our analysis using PPS is 
limited to the 1995-2006 period. 
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Table 4, Panel A, shows the results for the regression of |DA| on PPS. The 
OLS coefficient estimate for PPS is positive but not significantly different from zero. 
The QR results show that the coefficient on PPS is positive but not statistically 
significant at most of the below-median quantiles of |DA (except the 0.10 and 0.15 
quantiles). However, the coefficient is significantly positive at all of the above-median 
quantiles and increases with the quantile level. Untabulated results show that the 
coefficient at each of the 0.65-0.95 quantiles is significantly different from the 
coefficient at each of the 0.05-0.60 quantiles. 
Table 4, Panel B, shows the results for the regression of DA on PPS. The OLS 
coefficient estimate for PPS is negative but not significantly different from zero. The 
QR results show that the coefficient on PPS is significantly negative at or below the 
0.40 quantile and is significantly positive at the 0.95 quantile. Untabulated results 
show that the coefficient at the 0.95 quantiles is significantly different from the 
coefficient at the other quantiles. 
Overall, the results when measuring the CEO equity incentives by 
pay-for-performance sensitivity are qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 2 
and 3 for EQCOM. We also obtain similar results (not shown) when measuring the 
CEO equity incentives by the ratio of stock option grants to total compensation 
(Hanlon, et al. 2003).  
6.2 Controlling for additional confounding factors 
In the robustness tests we further control for several factors that could be 
associated with discretionary accruals. Those factors include firm age, auditor type, 
and audit opinion. Prior studies find that firms that are older or audited by a Big-N 
auditor tend to have lower accruals, whereas firms that receive a qualified audit 
opinion tend to have higher accruals. We measure firm age as the length of time (in 
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years) since the first year the firm’s financial data are available on Compustat.12 
Auditor type is an indicator variable which equals one if the firm is audited by a 
Big-N auditor an zero otherwise. Audit opinion is an indicator variable which equals 
one if the firm receives a qualified audit opinion and zero otherwise. We also include 
a set of indicator variables to control for the year effects. The results are similar to 
those reported in Tables 2 and 3 after we include the above control variables in the 
regressions.  
 
6.3 Other robustness tests 
Endogeneity could be a concern in empirical tests when the dependent and 
independent variables are contemporaneous. To address this problem, we follow prior 
studies to use the lagged value of equity compensation as an instrumental variable for 
EQCOM and estimate the same QR model. The regression results (not tabulated) are 
similar to those reported in the tables.  
In the primary analyses we regress the level of discretionary accruals on the 
level of equity incentives (equity-based compensation divided by total compensation). 
This type of “levels model” could be subject to the correlated omitted variables 
problem and may not be as powerful as the “changes model.” To address this concern, 
we take the first difference of the variables in Equation (7) and estimate QR for the 
new model. The regression results (not tabulated) are still similar to those reported in 
the tables.  
In summary, we conduct various robustness tests and find the QR results to be 
largely consistent with those based on the models and measures of variables in the 
primary analyses. The quantile-varying relationships between equity incentives and 
                                                 
12 We do not use the firm’s real age as it is not practical to collect such data manually for a large 
sample. 
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earnings management appear to be robust.   
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
The widespread use of equity-based compensation in executive compensation 
packages has raised concerns that excessive equity compensation motivates earnings 
management. A number of studies examine this issue but the evidence is not 
conclusive. Our study contributes to this line of research by using a less restrictive 
methodology and providing evidence that helps to reconcile the inconsistent results 
among the prior studies. Specifically, we investigate the association between equity 
compensation and earnings management using the quantile regression, which allows 
the parameter estimates to vary over the distribution of the dependent variable. Unlike 
the OLS and LAD regressions which rely on the central tendency distribution of the 
dependent variable, the quantile regression also examines the dependent variable at 
the tails of the distribution, thus facilitating an investigation of the relationship 
between equity compensation and earnings management across the entire distribution 
of the firms’ financial reporting quality. 
We use discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management, where 
higher (positive) accruals imply more income-increasing earnings management and 
larger absolute discretionary accruals imply more extreme earnings management. We 
measure equity compensation as the total value of restricted stock and stock options 
granted to the CEO divided by the CEO’s total compensation, but we also use other 
measures in the robustness tests. Our sample consists of 18,203 non-financial 
firm-year observations in the U.S. (S&P 500 and medium and small cap) during the 
period from 1995 to 2008. 
The quantile regression results show that the association between equity 
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compensation and discretionary accruals varies substantially across the distribution of 
the firms’ financial reporting quality (accruals), and some of the quantile regression 
results are very different from the OLS regression results. We find that equity 
compensation is positively associated with absolute discretionary accruals, but the 
association is much stronger at the high quantiles of absolute discretionary accruals 
and is economically trivial at the low quantiles. We also find that equity compensation 
is positively associated with signed values of discretionary accruals only at the very 
high quantiles of discretionary accruals, but it is negatively associated with signed 
values of discretionary accruals at the low quantiles. The regression results are robust 
to alternative measures of discretionary accruals and equity incentives and alternative 
model specifications.  
Overall, the evidence in our study suggests that equity compensation 
motivates income-increasing earnings management only when the firm has 
characteristics associated with lower financial reporting quality. We find no evidence 
that equity compensation motivates earnings management when the firm’s financial 
reporting quality is high. Our quantile regression results also demonstrate that the 
OLS and LAD optimization techniques only capture the behaviors of firms with 
financial reporting quality at the medium quantiles. Outside this range, the OLS and 
LAD methods are more likely to overestimate (underestimate) the association 
between equity compensation and earnings management as the firm’s financial 
reporting quality moves towards the high (low) end. 
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Appendix A: The bootstrap estimate of the standard error  
Assume we have a real-valued estimator (X
∧β 1, X2, ..., Xn), which is a function of 
n independently and identically distributed observations: 
 
,~,...,, 21 FXXX
iid
n                                               (A1) 
 
F being an unknown probability distribution on a space κ. Having observed X1 = x1, 
X2 = x2, ..., Xn = xn, we wish to obtain an estimate of the standard error of . 
∧β
    The true standard error of  is a function of F, n, and the form of the 
estimator , say 
∧β
∧β
 
).())(.,.,...,.,,( FnF σβσ =∧                                         (A2) 
 
This last notation emphasizes that, knowing n and the form of , the true standard 
error is only a function of the unknown distribution F. 
∧β
The bootstrap estimate of the standard error, , is simply B
∧σ
 
),(
∧∧ = FB σσ                                                    (A3) 
 
where
∧
F  is the empirical probability distribution 
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    ,1: ixonn
massF
∧
    i=1, 2,…, n.                               (A4) 
 
In practice, the function σ(F) is usually impossible to express in simple form, and 
 must be evaluated using a Monte Carlo algorithm: B
∧σ
 
Step 1. Construct 
∧
F  as at (A4).  
Step 2. Draw a bootstrap sample from
∧
F , 
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Step 3. Independently repeat Step 2 some number B times, obtaining bootstrap 
replications , ,…, , and calculate )1(*
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As B → ∞, the right-hand side of (A6) converges to .  )(
∧
Fσ
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Table 1 
 Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of variables 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistic of variables 
Variable Mean Standard Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
DA -0.0116 0.2882 -0.0429 -0.0055 0.0302 
|DA| 0.0690 0.2801 0.0161 0.0367 0.0734 
EQCOM 0.4210 0.2941 0.1528 0.4502 0.6588 
BM 0.5859 6.1828 0.2632 0.4251 0.6409 
OCF 0.1135 0.1400 0.0618 0.1078 0.1670 
LEV 0.5020 0.2037 0.3529 0.5190 0.6525 
SIZE 7.1923 1.5826 6.0631 7.0552 8.1983 
 
Panel B: Correlation coefficients of variables 
Variable DA |DA| EQCOM BM OCF LEV 
|DA| -0.6146**      
EQCOM -0.0167* 0.0188*     
BM 0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0001    
OCF 0.0062 -0.1430** 0.0282** -0.0228**   
LEV 0.0157* -0.0617** -0.0376** 0.0181* -0.1320**  
SIZE -0.0099 -0.0634** 0.1898** 0.0038 0.0613** 0.4471** 
 
Variable definitions:  
DA = Discretionary accruals (Total accruals less nondiscretionary accruals) 
|DA| = Absolute value of DA 
EQCOM = Value of restricted stock and stock options granted to the CEO divided by 
total compensation 
BM = Book value of common equity/Market value of equity 
OCF = Net cash flows from operations/divided by total assets 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of book value of total asset 
LEV = Total liabilities divided by total assets 
 
The sample consists of 18,203 firm-year observations (2,320 unique firms) for the period 
from 1995 to 2008. * and ** denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively.  
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Table 2  
Results from regression of absolute discretionary accruals (|DA|) on equity compensation and 
control variables – OLS and quantile regressions at various quantile levels of |DA| 
 
|DAi,t| = β0 + β1EQCOMi,t + β2BMi,t + β3OCFi,t + β4LEVi,t + β5SIZEi,t + εi,t, 
 
 
Panel A:  
Regression results for equity compensation 
(EQCOM) 
Panel B:  
Results for test of equality of coefficient 
on EQCOM between quantiles 
 Coefficient t-value p-value Adjusted-R2
Quantiles 
compared F-statistics p-value 
OLS 0.0247 3.45 0.001 0.0278    
Quantile    Pseudo R2    
0.05 0.0017 3.85 0.000 0.003    
0.10 0.0031 5.55 0.000 0.005 0.10 vs. 0.05 10.22 0.001 
0.15 0.0046 5.51 0.000 0.006 0.15 vs. 0.10 12.73 0.000 
0.20 0.0053 6.51 0.000 0.008 0.20 vs. 0.15 2.94 0.086 
0.25 0.0066 8.29 0.000 0.010 0.25 vs. 0.20 9.89 0.002 
0.30 0.0083 8.16 0.000 0.012 0.30 vs. 0.25 12.13 0.000 
0.35 0.0094 8.15 0.000 0.014 0.35 vs. 0.30 3.85 0.049 
0.40 0.0108 9.08 0.000 0.017 0.40 vs. 0.35 9.47 0.002 
0.45 0.0132 9.90 0.000 0.019 0.45 vs. 0.40 19.75 0.000 
0.50 (LAD) 0.0157 12.39 0.000 0.021 0.50 vs. 0.45 19.45 0.000 
0.55 0.0184 10.13 0.000 0.023 0.55 vs. 0.50 14.53 0.000 
0.60 0.0209 9.72 0.000 0.026 0.60 vs. 0.55 15.47 0.000 
0.65 0.0247 9.83 0.000 0.028 0.65 vs. 0.60 17.27 0.000 
0.70 0.0276 12.70 0.000 0.031 0.70 vs. 0.65 10.59 0.001 
0.75 0.0333 10.01 0.000 0.033 0.75 vs. 0.70 13.91 0.000 
0.80 0.0403 9.37 0.000 0.036 0.80 vs. 0. 75 15.36 0.000 
0.85 0.0480 12.45 0.000 0.038 0.85 vs. 0.80 13.47 0.000 
0.90 0.0634 8.99 0.000 0.041 0.90 vs. 0.85 10.21 0.001 
0.95 0.0973 6.48 0.000 0.048 0.95 vs. 0.90 12.39 0.000 
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions and sample descriptions. Panel A presents coefficient estimates, 
t-values, and p-values for equity compensation (EQCOM). Panel B presents F-statistics and p-values 
for tests of equality of coefficient for EQCOM between the indicated two quantiles of |DA|. Only the 
results for EQCOM are presented in this table. 
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Table 3  
 Results from regression of signed values of discretionary accruals (DA) on equity compensation 
and control variables – OLS and quantile regressions at various quantile levels of DA 
 
DAi,t = β0 + β1EQCOMi,t + β2BMi,t + β3OCFi,t + β4LEVi,t + β5SIZEi,t + εi,t, 
 
 
Panel A:  
Regression results for equity compensation 
(EQCOM) 
Panel B:  
Results for test of equality of coefficient 
on EQCOM between quantiles 
 Coefficient t-value p-value Adjusted-R2
Quantiles 
compared F-statistics p-value 
OLS -0.0121 -1.62 0.105 0.001    
Quantile    Pseudo R2    
0.05 -0.0919 -10.37 0.000 0.035    
0.10 -0.0629 -16.40 0.000 0.037 0.10 vs. 0.05 14.96 0.000 
0.15 -0.0466 -21.39 0.000 0.040 0.15 vs. 0.10 37.24 0.000 
0.20 -0.0386 -18.11 0.000 0.042 0.20 vs. 0.15 49.90 0.000 
0.25 -0.0303 -16.68 0.000 0.043 0.25 vs. 0.20 26.85 0.000 
0.30 -0.0249 -15.73 0.000 0.043 0.30 vs. 0.25 34.40 0.000 
0.35 -0.0219 -15.37 0.000 0.042 0.35 vs. 0.30 10.98 0.001 
0.40 -0.0196 -13.25 0.000 0.042 0.40 vs. 0.35 11.35 0.001 
0.45 -0.0177 -15.00 0.000 0.043 0.45 vs. 0.40 4.16 0.041 
0.50 (LAD) -0.0162 -10.67 0.000 0.044 0.50 vs. 0.45 2.46 0.117 
0.55 -0.0130 -9.93 0.000 0.045 0.55 vs. 0.50 21.36 0.000 
0.60 -0.0088 -4.99 0.000 0.047 0.60 vs. 0.55 25.84 0.000 
0.65 -0.0052 -2.68 0.007 0.049 0.65 vs. 0.60 18.50 0.000 
0.70 -0.0027 -1.22 0.223 0.052 0.70 vs. 0.65 7.08 0.008 
0.75 0.0007 0.29 0.772 0.055 0.75 vs. 0.70 10.26 0.001 
0.80 0.0044 1.49 0.136 0.058 0.80 vs. 0. 75 12.78 0.000 
0.85 0.0074 2.43 0.015 0.063 0.85 vs. 0.80 2.21 0.137 
0.90 0.0111 3.05 0.002 0.070 0.90 vs. 0.85 2.29 0.131 
0.95 0.0266 4.33 0.000 0.081 0.95 vs. 0.90 10.30 0.001 
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions and sample descriptions. Panel A presents coefficient estimates, 
t-values, and p-values for equity compensation (EQCOM). Panel B presents F-statistics and p-values 
for tests of equality of coefficient for EQCOM between the indicated two quantiles of |DA|. Only the 
results for EQCOM are presented in this table. 
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Table 4  
Results from regression of absolute and signed values of discretionary accruals (|DA| and DA, 
respectively) on pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) and control variables – OLS and quantile 
regressions at various quantile levels of |DA| and DA  
 
|DAi,t| or DAi,t = β0 + β1PPSi,t + β2BMi,t + β3OCFi,t + β4LEVi,t + β5SIZEi,t + εi,t
 
 Panel A: Dependent variable = |DA| Panel B: Dependent variable = DA 
 Regression results for PPS Regression results for PPS 
 Coefficient (×103) t-value p-value 
Adjusted-
R2
Coefficient 
(×103) t-value p-value 
Adjusted-
R2
OLS 0.1147 1.43 0.153 0.030 -0.0335 -0.39 0.699 0.012 
Quantile    Pseudo R2    Pseudo R2
0.05 0.0019 0.85 0.395 0.002 -0.1606 -6.71 0.000 0.025 
0.10 0.0070 2.52 0.012 0.004 -0.0912 -4.61 0.000 0.028 
0.15 0.0118 1.70 0.089 0.006 -0.0590 -2.52 0.012 0.032 
0.20 0.0047 0.59 0.553 0.007 -0.0690 -3.49 0.000 0.037 
0.25 0.0104 1.41 0.158 0.009 -0.0507 -3.29 0.001 0.039 
0.30 0.0152 1.54 0.125 0.011 -0.0373 -3.60 0.000 0.041 
0.35 0.0163 1.38 0.167 0.014 -0.0258 -2.32 0.020 0.042 
0.40 0.0171 1.32 0.188 0.016 -0.0188 -1.78 0.075 0.043 
0.45 0.0161 1.54 0.123 0.019 -0.0103 -0.60 0.552 0.045 
0.50 
(LAD) 0.0233 2.04 0.041 0.020 -0.0011 -0.04 0.968 0.047 
0.55 0.0288 2.74 0.006 0.022 -0.0255 -0.90 0.368 0.049 
0.60 0.0329 3.47 0.001 0.024 -0.0166 -0.65 0.513 0.052 
0.65 0.0458 6.07 0.000 0.026 -0.0099 -0.41 0.683 0.055 
0.70 0.0550 5.75 0.000 0.028 -0.0004 -0.02 0.986 0.059 
0.75 0.0558 7.04 0.000 0.030 -0.0106 -0.50 0.617 0.063 
0.80 0.0765 11.61 0.000 0.033 0.0036 0.13 0.900 0.068 
0.85 0.1021 6.42 0.000 0.035 0.0086 0.23 0.815 0.073 
0.90 0.1529 10.78 0.000 0.039 0.0269 1.50 0.134 0.081 
0.95 0.2054 6.13 0.000 0.044 0.0733 2.98 0.003 0.091 
 
PPS equals the partial derivative of the Black-Scholes option value for the stock options held by the 
CEO with respect to the stock price. See Table 1 for definition of other variables. Panels A and B 
present coefficient estimates, t-values, and p-values for equity compensation (EQCOM) in the 
regression of |DA| and DA, respectively. Only the results for PPS are presented in this table. The 
sample period for the tests in this table is from 1995 to 2006.  
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Figure 1 Coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for equity compensation 
(EQCOM) in the regression of absolute discretionary accruals (|DA|) 
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Figure 2 Coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for book-to-market ratio (BM), net cash flows from operations (OCF), 
leverage (LEV), and size (SIZE) in the quantile regressions of absolute discretionary accruals 
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Figure 3 Coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for equity compensation 
(EQCOM) in the regression of signed values of discretionary accruals (DA) 
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Figure 4 Coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for book-to-market ratio (BM), net cash flows from operations (OCF), 
leverage (LEV), and size (SIZE) in the quantile regressions of signed values of discretionary accruals 
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